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Abstract
In a non-cooperative strategic environmental regulation, unilateral
regulation may yield the so-called \carbon-leakage\ and the govern-
ment choice over the emission taxes and quotas play an important
role. Furthermore, the trade and industrial structure of a country crit-
ically hinges on the government's policy tools. The paper shows that
emission taxes makes the competitive production equilibrium unstable,
while emission standards work as \hidden production subsidy\ towards
emission-intensive industries.
Keywords: global warming, strategic environmental regulation, emis-
sion quota, emission tax, carbon leakage, emission standards, .
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1 Introduction
Global warming, that is caused by increasing the level of green-house gases
(GHGs) such as carbon dioxide, is expected to seriously a®ect economic ac-
tivities through climate changes. The reduction of GHGs has been discussed
in a number of international conventions. In particular, the third Confer-
ence of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (COP3) held in Kyoto at the end of 1997 was notable in the sense
that a legally binding protocol, so called, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted.1
The protocol includes two important agreements. First, the targets of
reduction in GHGs in 38 developed countries were explicitly set. Annex I
countries (which consists of OECD countries and countries in the former
USSR and eastern Europe) as a whole reduce emission 5.2 percent below
1990 levels between 2008 and 2012. For this, each country was committed
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1to a speci¯c target level.2 An important question faced by these countries
is, however, how these targets should be implemented. It seems that this
question has not fully been explored in the existing literature.
Second, emission trading, joint implementation (JI) and clean develop-
ment mechanism (CDM) were accepted.3 These mechanisms give Annex I
countries some degree of °exibilities to implement the targets.4 It is ac-
tually expected that some countries such as US and Japan cannot achieve
their targets without these mechanisms, especially, emission trading.
It is no doubt that the Kyoto Protocol is a signi¯cant step for the reduc-
tion of GHG emission, but developing countries have no obligation to the
reduction.5 With only partial participation by countries to the framework
of GHG emission reduction, a concern is carbon leakage. That is, even if the
level of GHG emission falls in Annex I countries, it may rises in the other
counties. As a result, the worldwide level may rise. Moreover, the par-
tial participation may a®ect international trade in goods and foreign direct
investment.
The purpose of this paper is to theoretically examine GHG emission reg-
ulations in the framework of open economy. We examine emission quota,
emission tax, and emission standard and compare them. In particular, we
explicitly consider the e®ect of the introduction of those regulations on the
economy and international trade, which has not been analyzed in the previ-
ous literature.
Although global warming has been attracting a considerable attention,
there are not many rigorous studies thattackle the issue in the context of in-
ternational trade theory. Early studies relating to global warming are those
that deal with international externalities (particularly, cross-border pollu-
tion).6 There are two types of external diseconomies: one makes consumers
worse o® and the other lowers some productivity.
Markusen (1975a) seems to be the ¯rst that explicitly analyzes inter-
national negative externalities in the context of international trade theory.
He derives necessary conditions that characterize an optimal tax structure
when one of the countries unilaterally imposes taxes or provides subsidies.
Markusen (1975b,1976) extends the above analysis by taking account of the
2For example, the targets of EU, US, Japan, Russia and Australia are, respectively,
-8%, -7%, -6%, 0% and+8%.
3JI is a joint project to decrease GHG emission among Annex I countries, while CDM
is one between Annex I countries and non Annex I countries. The amount of reduction
obtained by a project is distributed as credit among participating countries.
4These three mechanisms were named \Kyoto mechanism" in COP4 held in Buenos
Aires in 1998.
5There was an agreement in COP1 that developing countries should not be under any
new obligation to the reduction.
6In international trade theory, a number of researches conducted with international
externalities is very small relative to that with local externalities. Studies of trade and
environment under local externalities include Copeland and Taylor (1994,1999).
2dependence and interaction between two countries when a bilateral external-
ity exists. While the level of pollution enters in the social welfare function
in Markusen (1975a,b), the stock of a common property resource a®ects
production in Markusen (1976).7
Although their frameworks are somewhat restrictive, Ludema and Wooton
(1994) and Copeland (1996) deal with interesting issues in the presence of
cross-border negative externalities. They pont out that strategic aspects
could arise when there exist pollution regulations.8
Copeland and Taylor (1995, 1999) use Heckscher-Ohlin frameworks to
analyze trade and environment. In their models, two factors are labor and
emission.9 For production, thus, ¯rms have to purchase an emission permit,
the price of which is equal to the marginal product of emission. Since coun-
tries share the common technologies, it is crucial in their analyses whether
the factor price equalization holds. Their utility functions, in which the total
level of emission enters, are key to their results, because the linkage between
the income level and the sensitivity to environment is explicitly introduced.
Copeland andTaylor (1995)analyze the e®ectsof international trade (be-
tween Northand South) and environmental policy ontrade follows, pollution
levels and welfare in the presence of transboundary pollution. Copeland and
Taylor (1999) explicitly focuses on the relationship between global warming
and international trade. They show that trade in permits may either be
redundant or make participants to trade in goods and permits worse o® and
that unilateral emission reduction by North may decrease emission by South
due to income e®ect.
As brie°y reviewed so far, the previous literature does notdirectly inquire
into how each country's choice of environment regulatory policies a®ects ei-
ther the world abatement performance or the own country's trade structure.
As the present paper will show, a country's strategic choice of emission con-
trols greatly a®ects not only the volume of the world total green-house gas
(GHG) emission volume through the so-called "carbon leakage" e®ect but
also each country's welfare. By applying the tari®-quota equivalence theo-
rem in international trade, we will ¯nd that in strategic environment policy
7Because of international production externalities, Markusen (1976) is also related to
another trade and environment issue, i.e., the analysis of trade and renewable resources,
for which dynamic frameworks is often used. See Chichilnisky (1993), L¶ opez (1994), and
Brander and Taylor (1998), for example.
8Using a partial equilibrium framework, Ludema and Wooton (1994) examine the na-
tions' strategic policy choices when pollution abatement technology exists and trade tax
and/or externality tax are available. Copeland (1996) analyses the optimal policy of
the importing country and points out that pollution regulations (such as pollution quota
and tax and process standard) taken by the exporting country may create rent-shifting
opportunities for the importing country.
9Chichilnisky (1994) also uses a Heckscher-Ohlin framework where one of two factors
is environmental resources and both factors are endogenously supplied. In her analy-
sis, North-South trade and the overuse of environmental resources arise because of the
di®erence in property rights between North and South.
3games the equivalence between emission quotas and emission taxes breaks
down, thoughit holds in a closed economy. Choice of emission quota is likely
to be more e®ective to restrain the world GHG emission.
Furthermore, if international commodity trade is free, then a country's
choice of emission controls over emission quotas, emission taxes and emis-
sion standards critically a®ects stability of the resulting trade and produc-
tion structure. Two important results are as follows. First, when a gov-
ernment tries to replicate the production equilibrium in free trade under
the emission quota with the equivalent emission taxes, then the equilib-
rium becomes unstable. The country may completely specialize either in
the emission-intensive industry or in the emission non-intensive one. Ei-
ther specialization pattern will turn out to be possible and stable. Second,
when a government enforces the equivalent emission standards achieving
the emission per unit of output at the emission-quota equilibrium, then
only completely specialization in the emission-intensive industry is possible
at the resulting equilibrium insofar as the emission intensities di®er between
the industries and there is no emission intensity reversals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the
¯rst issue stated above, i.e., the e®ect of a country's choice between emission
quotas and emission taxes over the world GHG emission performance by
using a simple three country model where a single ¯nal good is produced
by fossil fuels and its production emits GHG over the world. We will then
explore into the resulting e®ect of the so-called "carbon leakage" and the
welfare of each country from the view-point of strategic environment policy
games by applying the tari®-quota equivalence theorem.
In section 3, we further look into the e®ects of those emission controls
over each country's trade and production structure. We will ¯rst show that
when the abatement activity is formulated as further inputs of labor, the
economy can be modeled as a standard Heckscher-Ohlin two-by-two model
where the two factors are labor and environment resource. The economic
e®ects of emission controls in the form of emission quotas are then clari¯ed
to further explore into the e®ects of policy switches from emission quotas to
other equivalent policies such as emission taxes and emission standards.
The last section concludes the paper with some discussion on the im-
plications of the results for managing international emissions trading in the
Kyoto mechanism.
42 Emission Controls, Carbon Leakage, and Strate-
gic Environment Regulations
2.1 Basic Structure of the Model
Consider a world consisting of three countries, 1, 2 and 3. The ¯rst two
countries uses fossil fuels for production and emits green-house gases (GHG).
Neither of them can produce fossil fuels for themselves, and both must de-
pend on their imports from abroad. And this supply of fossil fuels is made
by the last third country. Country 3 produces fossil fuels but does not emit
any GHG.
Let us give a further structure to country 3's economy. Its welfare con-
sists only of the pro¯ts from selling its fossil fuels to the rest of the world.
Let X denote the total amount of fossil fuels produced, C(X) the associated
total cost function and p the world price of the fossil fuel. Then the welfare
of country 3 is assumed to be expressed by
u3 = pX ¡ C(X)( 1 )
For simplicity of exposition, we assume that country 3 is a price taker in
the world fossil fuel market. Thus it determines its fossil fuel supply so as
to equate the world price p with the marginal cost C0(X), which is assumed
to be increasing in the output. Thus its supply price of fossil fuel is given






Since the marginal cost of producing fossil fuel is increasing, country 3's
supply curve becomes upward sloping with respect to the fuel price.
Let us depict the structures of the two fuel consuming countries, coun-
tries 1 and 2. When we assume away the e®ects of abatement activities,
there must be a one-to-one technological relationship between country i's
amount of fuel consumption xi andits amount of GHG emission zi.W ec a l l
this relationship the emission technology and express by
zi = Gi(xi)f o ri =1 ;2( 3 )
By consuming fossil fuels, each fuel-consuming country can produce var-
ious goods and services, the value of which we express by the GDP function
fi(xi). Since the fuels must be imported from abroad with a unit price p,
its net bene¯t is equal to fi(xi) ¡ pxi.
However this is not an end of the story. Since each fuel-consuming
country emits GHG as much as zi, the world total GHG emission becomes
Z = z1 + z2. This GHG emission damages the global environment as much
as measured by the global warming damage function D(Z). We assume that
5the marginal global warming damage D0(Z) is increasing in the total GHG
emission. And country i perceives its 100 £ °i %a si t so w nd a m a g e 10.
To sum up, country i's welfare is given by








Put (2) into (4). Then one can express each fuel-consuming country's
national welfare as a function of the fuel consumption pro¯le (x1;x 2)a s
below:







2.2 Free Emission Equilibrium
At ¯rst, let us see what equilibrium emerges when no fuel-consuming coun-
try's governments imposes any GHG emission controls and they allow their
private sector to seek for the own pro¯t maximization. The resulting fuel
consumption level should equate the marginal value product of fossil fuel
f0(xi) with its world price p.
f0
i(xi)=p (6)
Assume that the marginal value product of fossil fuels is decreasing. Then
an increase in the world price of the fossil fuel decreases each country's fuel
consumption, leading to a reduction in GHG emission.
What is important is that each country's GHG emission is not indepen-
dent of the other's. As is shown by (??), when one country increases its
GHG emission, the other country has an incentive to reduce its GHG emis-
sion through an increase in the world price of fossil fuel. In this sense, the
equation (6) with the fuel price being replaced with the fuel supply price
function P(X),
f0
i(xi)=Ps(xi + xj)( 7 )
gives country i's private reaction function, showing its optimal fuel con-
sumption given the other's.
The private reaction curve associated with the private reaction function
of country i is depicted by curve R
p
i in Figure 1. The intersection of the two
private reaction curves represents the free emission equilibrium Epp where
the private sectors can freely and competitively choose their fuel consump-
tion levels without being subject to the governments' GHG controls.
10Note that we do not impose a condition i ¯i =1 . T h i si sb e c a u s et h e r em a y
be damages from global warming on the areas with no human beings or there may be
externalities in damage perception, i.e., there may be some countries which value the
well-being of other countries.






















02.3 GHG Emission Control by Direct Regulations
What if each country's government begins to regulate its own GHG emission
level? Let us ¯rst consider the case when the government employs emission
quotas over the country's total GHG emission volume11.
2.3.1 Emission Quota Equilibrium
A country, if it is a small country in the world fuel market, worsens her
welfare by intervening in free private trade. But this is not true for large
countries. A large country importing fuels may have a strategic incentive to
restrain her import, lower the world fuel price and thus to improve her terms
of trade. When global warming matters, she may ¯nd further gains from
strategic fuel import control, for the resulting change in the fuel price a®ects
other countries' fuel consumption and thus their GHG emission volumes.
She can indirectly alter the damages from global warming. To clarify these
strategic e®ects, we assume hereafter that the two fuel-consuming countries
are large in the world fuel market.
Assume that each fuel-consuming country's government regulates the
country's total GHG emission and thus indirectly intervenes in fuel trade.
We need each government's reaction curve for delineating the resulting equi-
libria. We call country i's government government i, and let R
QQ
i (xj)g o v -
ernment i's reaction function. When country i's fuel consumption xi is equal
to R
QQ
i (xj), it should maximize country i's welfare given by (5) given coun-
try j's fuel consumption xj. Thus it should satisfy the following ¯rst-order
condition for welfare maximization12:
0=f0
i(xi) ¡ Ps(Xi + xj) ¡ P 0
s(xi + xj)xi ¡ °iD0(Z)G0
i(xi)( 8 )
The ¯rst ¯rst term on the RHS represents the marginal value product
of fossil fuel, the second term the world fuel price (the marginal fuel con-
sumption costs for a small country), the third term the marginal loss from
terms-of-trade (TOT) deterioration due to an increase in the own fuel con-
sumption, and the last term the marginal global warming e®ect, i.e., the
marginal damage from aggravation in global warming. Assuming that the
payo® function is strictly concave in the own fuel consumption, country i's
best response fuel consumption depends on country j's through the TOT
11There are two major policy tools to achieve the present total emission control of GHG.
One is to cast a cap over the total emission volume with emission quota to the private
sector. Another is to control the total emission volume at a speci¯ed target level by
suitably choosing carbon tax rates. Note that the carbon tax policy here di®ers from the
one discussed later. The carbon tax policy as total emission control allows the carbon tax
rates so as to keep the total emission level equal to the target level, while the ordinary
carbon tax policy requires the government to commit to a speci¯ed tax rate.
12Af u n c t i o nw i t hs u p e r s c r i p tj represents the function partially di®erentiated to country
j's fuel consumption.
8e®ect and the marginal global warming e®ect. The reaction curve associated
with xi = R
QQ
i (xj) is shown by curve R
QQ
i in Figure 1. The intersection
of the two reaction curves, EQQ represents an equilibrium where both fuel-
consuming country's governments directly control their total GHG emission
volumes.
The reaction curves in Figure 1 are described as downward sloping
curves. This is the case in which each country's fuel consumption is a strate-
gic substitute to the other's. In general, it may not be the case. The reaction
curve of a country's government may be upward sloping, i.e., a country's fuel
consumption may become a strategic complement to the other's. A factor
giving the dividing line between strategic substitutes and complements is a
size of the change in the TOT e®ect due to an increase in the other country's
fuel consumption. In fact, an increase in the other country's fuel consump-
tion raises the world fuel price and the marginal global warming e®ect, both
of which increases the country's marginal fuel consumption costs. However
the direction and the size of the changes in the TOT e®ects are generally
ambiguous, which makes it di±cult for us to predict whether the reaction
curves are downward or upward sloping.
However, fortunately, the succeeding analysis does not depend on the
assumptions on strategic substitutes and complements, as will be shown
below. What is necessary for inquiry is the so-called equilibrium stability





¯ ¯ ¯ < 1f o ri;j =1 ;2(j 6= i)( 9 )
We impose this stability condition for each possible reaction curve of
both countries including the private reaction ones.
2.3.2 Free Emission Equilibrium vs. Direct Total Emission Con-
trol Equilibrium
Before comparing the two equilibria, Epp and EQQ, let us ¯rst discuss the
e®ects of direct total emission control by a single country, say country 1,
when the other country 2 maintains laissez-faire in GHG emission. As shown
in Figure 1, the reaction function of country 1's government R
QQ
1 is located
left to the private counterpart R
p
1. There are two factors causing this inward
shift.
First, the government takes into account the TOT deterioration e®ect
which is neglected in the private decision over fuel consumption. Second,
the government also cares an increase in the marginal global warming e®ect,
which is also neglected by the private sector. These two factors makes the
government restrain its national fuel consumption compared with the private
decision.





government's starting to restrain the country's GHG emission, an equilib-
rium changes from the initial free emission equilibrium Epp to EQP. Insofar
as the absolute value of the slope of each reaction curve is than unity (equi-
librium stability condition), there must be a decrease in the world total fuel
consumption, leading to a drop in the world fuel price. This result has the
following implications.
First, the decrease in the world fuel price lets country 2 withoutemission
control have an incentive to expand its fuel consumption, leading to an
increase in its GHG emission. This is what is called the "carbon leakage"
e®ect.
Second, and more importantly, a country's emission control does not
necessarily lead to a decrease in the world total GHG emission. Since coun-
try 1's emission volume decreases with the total emission volume control but
country 2's increases by virtue of the carbon leakage e®ect, it is generally
ambiguous whether the world total GHG emission decrease or not. More
speci¯cally, when country 2's energy e±ciency is su±ciently lower than coun-
try 1's in the sense of more GHG emission per input of fuel, the result is an
increase in the world total GHG emission.13
Proposition 1 When only country 1 controls the own GHG emission vol-
ume, it has the following three e®ects.
1. The world fuel price decreases.
2. Country 2 without GHG emission quotas expands its fuel consumption
as well as its GHG emission.
3. The world total GHG emission volume increases if country 2's energy
e±ciency is su±ciently lower than country 1's.
As has been made clear, GHG emission quotas by the countries with
higher energy e±ciently cannot e®ectively restrain the world total GHG
emission without the cooperation from those with lower energy e±ciency.
13In the present paper, we assume away the income e®ects on the demand for higher
environmental quality. If those e®ects set in and the higher income strengthens demand
for the more improved global environment, then a su±ciently great decrease in the world
fuel price may give country 2 an incentive to regulate its GHG emission volume. This is
because the drop in the world fuel price increases country 2's real income. This is what
Copeland and Taylor (1999) discussed. However their argument seems to lack reality.
First, the size of real income increase to trigger emission control may be too large to
realize, particularly for developing countries. Second, there may be many countries, like
oil-producing ones, which su®er from a decrease in the real income due to the drop in
the world fuel price. If those countries initially employs any GHG emission quotas but
become less environment-minded after the real income loss , then the world total GHG
emission may increase even if there are some countries starting to control the emissions.
10When both countries, 1 and 2, i.e., all the fuel-consuming countries un-
dertakes emission quotas, there would be a decrease in the world total GHG
emission. This state is depicted by point EQQ in Figure 1.
2.3.3 Choices between emission taxes and emission quotas
As an policy instrument to control GHG emission, a country can also employ
emission taxes other than emission quotas. Their di®erence is that the
country's total GHG emission volume is kept at at the target level regardless
of the world fuel price, while in the case of emission taxes the emission
volume changes along with the world fuel price level through a change in
the fuel consumption. Then what if either of the two countries employs
emission taxes as a means to control the national GHG emission.
Assume that initially country 2 as well as country 1 employs direct emis-
sion control, and consider country 1's choice between emission taxes and
emission quotas. We note that given country 2's fuel consumption, the
choice does not matter for country 1 insofar as the two policies achieve the
best-response fuel consumption against country 2's. What does this mean?
When country 1 employs emission taxes and country emission quotas,
their reaction curves should be depicted over the plane of country 1's emis-
sion tax rate and country 2's fuel consumption volume. However when we
transform them into the plane of fuel consumption volumes, then country 1's
reaction curve should be the same as when it employs direct control. That
is, country 1's transformed reaction curve with emission taxes, expressed by
R
TQ




Similarly, when country 2 initially employs emission taxes, insofar as
country 2's policy level is given, it is indi®erent for country 1 between emis-






represents country 1's transformed reaction curve when it employs emission
quotas and country 2 employs emission taxes, and etc. And one should note
that each country's transformed reaction curve in Regime (T;T) , expressed
by RTT
i , should be located left to the private reaction curve R
p
i, for the gov-
ernment has an incentive to restrain fuel consumption for the reasons stated
earlier15.
Proposition 2 Given the other country's policy tool, the choice between
emission taxes and emission quotas does not matter for a country's govern-
ment.




1 .T h a ti s ,w h a te ® e c t s
arise to country 1's incentive for GHG emission when country 2 switches
14The superscripts, for example TQ,r e p r e s e n tt h es a t ei nw h i c hc o u n t r y1e m p l o y s
emission taxes (T) and country 2 direct control (Q).
15The result below is an extension of the tari®-quota equivalence theorem in trade to
the choices over the environmental policies in the international setting.
11from emission quotas to emission taxes? In fact, this has a very important
e®ect.
As discussed earlier, country 1's optimal fuel consumption should equate
the marginal value product of fuel, f0
i(xi) with the sum of the the following
three marginal cost of fuel consumption:
1. direct purchase cost of fuel, p
2. TOT deterioration e®ect
3. marginal global warming e®ect
When country 2 commits to a certain speci¯ed emission level, then the
second and third marginal costs arise only from country 1's own increase in
fuel consumption. However when country 2 employs emission taxes, then the
increase in the world fuel price due to country 1's consumption expansion
gives country 2 an incentive to reduce its fuel consumption16.T h i sd e c r e a s e
in country 2's fuel consumption eases the second and third marginal cost
e®ects, which lets country 1 expand further its fuel consumption than before.
Thus we have established
Proposition 3 Given the rival country's fuel consumption volume, a coun-
try's best response fuel-consumption volume is greater when the rival employs
emission taxes than when it employs emission quotas.
The results obtained so far are summarized in Figure 1.
What implications are obtained from the above discussion? First, when
either country controls the own GHG emission, the world total fuel con-
sumption decreases as well as the fuel price as is shown by a shift of an
equilibrium from Ep to EQp. We have already discussed the resulting e®ect
regarding the carbon leakage e®ect.
16More speci¯cally, country 1's best response fuel consumption given country 2's emis-
sion tax rate is obtained as follows. First, let t2 denote country 2's speci¯c emission tax.






where one shouldnote that G
0
2(x2) represents the marginal GHG emission of fuel in country
2. As is expressed in (??) country 2's fuel consumption depends on its own emission tax
rate t2 and country 1's x1, the relation of which we express by x2 = x
QT
2 (x1;t 2).

























As the ¯rst equation shows, given the initial fuel-consumption pair, if country 2 commits
to a speci¯ed rate of emission tax, then an increase in country 1's fuel consumption
decreases country 2's fuel consumption as discussed in the text.
12Second, the world total fuel consumption volume tends to be the small-
est when bothcountries regulate the own GHG emission by emission quotas.
T h u st h ew o r l dt o t a lG H Ge m i s s i o nv o l u m ew o u l db et h es m a l l e s ta te q u i -
librium EQQ.
Third, for a country committing to emission quotas, it is often more ben-
e¯cial that the other country employs emission taxes rather than emission
quotas. This is because the country with emission quotas can strategi-
cally expandthe own fuel consumption at the expense of the other country
through a price hike in the world fuel market.
Let us inquire into this strategic gains of country 1 more in detail by
using Figures 2 and 3. And for this inquiry, one may resort to the use of
iso-welfare contours. They take the same shapes as the iso-pro¯t curves in
homogeneous Cournot duopoly, for an increase in the other country's fuel
consumption aggravate the own TOT as well as global warming.





1 show two iso-welfare curves of country 1, where
the former is associated with equilibrium EQQ and the latter with EQT.
Since in Figure 2 country 2's fuel consumption is a strategic substitute to




















t21, the best fuel consumption pro¯le for country 1 along country 2's reaction
curve is the one such as point S r e q u i r i n ga ni n c r e a s ei nc o u n t r y1 ' sc o n -
sumption and a decrease in country 2's compared with a non-cooperative
equilibrium for emission quotas EQQ.I ti sap o i n ta c h i e v e dw h e nc o u n t r y1
acts as Stackelberg leader against country 2.
Since EQT is an equilibrium when country 1 chooses quotas and country
2 taxes, country 1's iso-welfare contour u
QT
1 should touch its feasibility locus
t2t2 which shows a locus of feasible fuel consumption pro¯les given country
2's equilibrium emission tax rate andwe call the iso-emission tax rate curve.
Then if the situation is the one in Figure 2, that is if the equilibrium is
located left to country 1's Stackelberg equilibrium S, country 1 should de¯-
nitely enhances its welfare compared with when country 2 chooses emission
quotas, i.e., EQQ.
However this is not the only possibility. As shown in Figure 3, country
1's welfare may become worse at EQT than at EQQ. The critical di®erence
between the two ¯gures is whether the iso-emission tax rate curve of country
2 is °atter in the absolute value than its reaction curve. If the iso-emission
tax rate curve of country 2 is sloper in the absolute value than its reaction
curve, then country 1 tend to overconsume fuel compared with its Stack-
elberg leader equilibrium S. If this overconsumption e®ect is su±ciently
strong, country 1 may ultimately lose from country 2's policy switch.
These results can be extended to the case where each country's fuel
consumption is a strategic complement to the other"s as shown in Figure 4.
Since each country's reaction curve is now upward sloping, country 2's iso-
emission tax rate curve, which is always downward sloping, has the smaller
slope than country 2's reaction curve. Thus it is straightforward to see that



















t2c o u n t r y1i sh u r tb yc o u n t r y2 ' ss w i t c hf r o mq u o t a st ot a x e s 1718.
Proposition 4 Country 2's policy switch from emission quota to emission
tax bene¯ts country 1 employing emission quota only if country 2's fuel con-
sumption is a strategic substitute to country 1's and country 2's iso-emission
tax rate curve has the larger slope than its own reaction curve at the equi-
librium when country 1 chooses quotas and country 2 taxes. Otherwise, it
t e n d st oh u r tc o u n t r y1.
Note that the conditions using the slopes of the iso-emission tax rate
curves and the reaction curves can be used to rank the welfare levels of each
country among other possible equilibria. But the essence of the argument is
the same, so that we skip such welfare comparison.
One of the most important conclusions from the present discussion is that
a country's choice of emission quotas signi¯cantly a®ects global warming as
well as each country's national welfare. However choice of environmental
policies does also a®ect each country's trade and production structure in
free commodity trade. Let us discuss this issue in the next section.
3 Trade Structure and Emission Controls
Let us build a trade model of a small country facing free commodity trade.
There are two goods (good 1 and good 2) that are produced using a single
factor (labor) with a CRS technology in competitive markets. The labor
coe±cient of good i (i =1 ;2) is given by ai. The endowment of labor is
given by L.
17By using the results in footnote 16, we may prove the result a little more rigorously.
To prove the result in the text, it su±ces to prove that country 1'swelfare is still increasing




















































































18Similar results hold even when we allow international emissions trading designed in
the Kyoto mechanism as discussed in Kiyono (2000).

























QT SProduction of one unit of good i (i =1 ;2) emits ei units of GHG. GHG
reduces economic welfare, but does not generate production externalities.
While GHG is a joint output, it is convenient to describe the output of good
i (i =1 ;2) as a function of labor input, Li, and the amount of GHG emitted
during production, Zi:
Xi = Fi(Li;Z i);i =1 ;2; (10)
where Fi is concave, continuously di®erentiable, and linearly homogeneous.
One should note that labor includes here inputs for emission abatement
behind technical substitution between labor and emission expressed by (10).
Thus although a ¯rm can reduce labor input by increasing GHG emission,
this substitution has a limit which is given by (¹ ai; ¹ ei). That is, ¹ ai is the
minimum amount of labor input while ¹ ei is the maximum amount of GHG
emission for one unit of good i production.
This can be illustrated using a unit isoquant (see Figure 5). The smooth
substitution between labor input and GHG emission is possible only in the
region above ¹ ai. It is obvious that ¯rms will use¹ ai units of labor to produce
one unit of good i without any emission regulation.
We let good 2 be numeraire and assume that the world relative price
of good 1, pw(´ pw
1 =pw
2 ), is exogenously given. Without any emission reg-
ulation, the production structure is that of Ricardian model. Thus, the




In the following, we assume (11) and examine various kinds of emission
regulations.
3.1 Emission Quota
As a benchmark of emission regulation, we ¯rst consider emission quotas.
The government sets an aggregate level of domestic emission of GHG which
is denoted by Z. To implement the emission level, the government issues
Z units of marketable emission permits. The permits can be traded freely
within the economy and the price of permit is denoted by r.
Once the permits have been issued, the economy behaves like a Heckscher-
Ohlin (HO) model which is described by the following:
ci(r;w) ¸ pw
i ;i =1 ;2; (12)
X
i
ai(r;w)Xi = L; (13)









ei(r;w)Xi · Z; (14)
where ci(:) is the unit cost function of good i.I f ci(:) >p w
i (i =1 ;2),
then the economy completely specializes in the other good, i.e., good j
(j =1 ;2;i 6= j). (13) shows the full employment of labor. In the HO model,
both factors are assumed to be fully employed, but inequality could hold in
(14). If this is the case, the permit price becomes zero.
The unit cost curve of good i is illustrated in Figure 6. Since the sub-
stitution between labor input and GHG emission is not always possible as
is shown in Figure 5, the unit cost curve has a segment portion, LiL0
i.T h e
slope of LiL0
i is equal to ¹ ei=¹ ai. For the following analysis, we de¯ne emission








and assume that good 1 is always more emission-intensive relative to good
2. That is, z1(r;w) >z 2(r;w)h o l d sf o ra n y( r;w). Using Shepherd's lemma,
the slope of the unit cost curve equals zi(r;w).
We now examine free trade equilibria both with and without emission
quota with the aid of Figure 7. Without any emission regulation, the pro-
duction possibility frontier (PPF) is given by L0
1L0
2, the slope of which is
a1=a2. With (11), the economy completely specializes in good 1 and its
output is L=¹ a1. The production and consumption points are, respectively,
given by L0




When emission quota is introduced, the PPF becomes F1F2.S i n c et h e
production structure is just like a HO model in the presence of emission
quota, F1F2 is (strictly) concave to the origin. The production point shifts
from L0
1 to Q where the world-relative-price line, pp,i st a n g e n tt oF1F2.
This shift can be decomposed into the following two e®ects.
The ¯rst is the introduction of emission quota without substitution be-
tween labor input and GHG emission. We call this e®ect the impact ef-
fect. Withoutthe substitution, the PPF is Z0
1Q0L0
2 which is de¯ned by (13)
(i.e.,L0
1L0
2) and (14) (i.e., Z0
1Z0
2).19 Thus, the impact e®ect corresponds to
the shift from L0
1 to Q0 where the world-relative price line is tangent to
Z0
1Q0L0
2 at point Q020.
The second is the substitution e®ect. The emission quota a®ects both
permit price and wage and hence the substitution between labor input and
emission arises. With the substitution, even when the emission quota is
the same at the initial level, the emission quota constraint becomes less
binding. That is, decreases in the emission coe±cients in both sectors shifts









20Full employment of labor implies that a1=a2 <p
w <e 1=e2.








0Figure 7: Trade and Production Structure under Emission Controls
the emission quota constraint from the initial curve Z0
1Z0
2 outward to the
new one Z1Z2. On the other hand, substitution between labor and emission
through abatement activities increases the labor coe±cients, which leads
to the inward shift of the labor endowment constraint from L0
1L0
2 to L1L2.
The new equilibrium given the emission quota is represented by point Q
along the new PPF shown by F1F2. The substitution e®ect corresponds
to the shift from Q0 to Q. Here one notes that point Q0 located within
the PPF shows production ine±ciency, for production at Q0 does not allow
substitution between labor and emission, which is in fact feasible.
With the aid of Figure 8, we examine the e®ects of emission quota on the
permit price, wage, GDP, and specialization patterns . In the ¯gure, LiCi
(i =1 ;2) is the unit cost curve of good i (i.e., (12) ). Since z1(r;w) >z 2(r;w)
for any (r;w), the unit cost curve of good 1 cuts that of good 2 from above.
Without any emission regulation, r = 0. Thus, the equilibrium is given
by L1. The wage of industry 1 which is indicated by L1 is higher than that
of industry 2 which is indicated by L2 and hence the economy completely
specializes in good 1. The impact e®ect of emission quota is the shift from
L1to Q0 where L1Z1 and L2Z2 intersect to each other.21 The substitution
e®ect is given by the shift from Q0 to Q if the economy is diversi¯ed and
from Q0 to a point on the factor price frontier formed by L1C1 and L2C2,
i.e.,L1QC2. The economy is diversi¯ed if z2(rQ;w Q) <Z = L<z 1(rQ;w Q).







































0The economy completely specializes in good 1 if Z=L ¸ z1(rQ;w Q)a n d
good 2 if Z=L · z2(rQ;w Q). When the economy completely specializes, the
equilibrium is given by a point on L1QC2 where its slope is equal to Z=L.
GDP per capita which is given by




can be measured by the intercept of the line that has the slope Z=L and
goes through the equilibrium point. It can easily be veri¯ed thatas the level
of emission quota lowers, the equilibrium point shifts down along the factor
price frontier, L1QC2. In Figure 7, the shift of production point induced by
decreasing the quota level is shown by L1F0
1QF0
2O. In Figure 7, Q happens
to be located on OC. If the social utility function is homothetic, then Q is
also the consumption point. If the level of emission quota becomes tighter,
thus, the trade pattern is reversed.
The above analysis is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose that emission quota is introduced under free trade.
The economy remains to completely specialize in good 1 if the level of quota
is high. If the level is low, however, the economy is diversi¯ed or completely
specializes in good 2. With the homothetic social utility function, as the quota
level falls, the exports of good 1 decrease and the trade pattern is eventually
reversed. The lower the quota level is, the lower the GDP.
3.2 Quota-Equivalent Emission Tax
We next examine emission tax, i.e., the tax per unit of GHG emission. The
government sets the level of emission tax r to reduce GHG emission. This
e®ect can be seen with the aid of Figure 7. Once the tax is determined, the
wage is also determined by the factor price frontier. If r = rT, for example,
then the wage is determined at T (i.e., w = wT) and specializes in good 1.
The GHG emission per capita is give by the slope of the factor price frontier
at T. The economy completely specializes in good 1 if 0 <r<r Q and good
2i fr>r Q.
It is obvious that the complete specialization equilibrium under emission
quota can be attained by setting the permit price equal to the emission tax.
And we call this rate of (speci¯c) emission tax the quota-equivalent emission
tax.
However, the quota-equivalent emission tax alone cannot lead to the
incomplete specialization equilibrium under emission quota, which is shown
by Q in Figure 8. When the government sets r = rQ, the wage becomes
identical. However, GHG emission may be di®erent between emission tax
and quota. This is because emission tax alone cannot uniquely determine
the outputs of goods 1 and 2 under free trade and hence the amount of GHG
emission.
24Proposition 6 If the economy specializes completely under emission quota,
the equilibrium can be attained with emission tax by setting the permit price
equal to the emission tax, i.e., the quota-equivalent emission tax. If the
economy is diversi¯ed under emission quota, however, the equilibrium cannot
be attained by the quota-equivalent emission tax alone.
Furthermore, with respect to the incomplete specialization equilibrium
under emission tax, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 7 A diversi¯ed equilibrium under the quota-equivalent emis-
sion tax is unstable, and the economy may specialize in either sector.
Let us con¯rm this result by using Figure 8. Suppose that the economy is
initially diversi¯ed at Q and then the world relative price of good 1 rises.
The unit cost curve of good 1 shifts outward (from L1C1 to L0
1C0
1). Given
r = rQ, the good-1 sector is now willing to pay the higher wage than the
good-2 sector. This drives the economy to complete specialization in good 1
w i t har i s ei nt h ep e r - c a p i t aG H Ge m i s s i o n .T h i si ss h o w ni nF i g u r e7b yt h e
movement from the initial quota-equilibrium Q to point L1. Note that once
the economy specializes in the good-1 sector, the production equilibrium is
now locally stable against small changes in the world prices.
If the world relative price of good 1 falls, on the other hand, the econ-
omy completely specializes in good 2 and the GHG emission per capita
falls. The production point in Figure 7 is located at L2.T h u s , e v e n i f
the quota-equivalent emission tax can support the the incomplete special-
ization equilibrium emission quota, a small change in the world price may
lead to drastic changes in GHG emission as well as the production and trade
structures when emission tax is used.
3.3 Quota-Equivalent Emission Standard
We investigate emission standard under which the government sets the level
of ei (i =1 ;2). This is actually equivalent to set the level of zi,i . e . ,t h e
emission intensity, or, to choose a speci¯c technology. Once zi is determined,
thus, the substitution between labor input and GHG emission becomes es-
sentially impossible. This is because once the government replaces emission
quotas with the quota-equivalent emission standards, the industries do not
have to pay emission permit prices, i.e., the costs for GHG emission, and
thus they try to minimize the abatement activities as much as possible. The
result is that each industry just meets the government emission standard
requirement.
Although there are many possible emission standard levels to choose,
we focus our attention on the emission standards which can replicate the
emission-quota equilibrium in the sense of achieving the same volume of
25GHG per output in each sector. We call such emission standard the quota-
equivalent emission standard22.
Now consider the e®ects of replacing the emission quota with the quota-
equivalent emission standards by using Figure 8. Noting that zi is equal to
the slope of the unit cost curve of good i, the factor price frontier with the
quota-equivalent emission standards is formed by the tangent lines to the
unit cost curves. As a result the FPF with emission standard is given by
EiQE0
i for the good-i industry. Since the emission permit is useless with the
quota-equivalent emission standards, the permit price becomes zero. Thus,
the equilibrium is located on the vertical wage axis. Since the good-1 sector
with the higher emission intensity can save the expenses for emission permits
more, it is willing to pay the higher wage 0E1 than the maximum wage
0E2 that the good-2 sector is willing to pay. That is, the quota-equivalent
emission standards work as hidden production subsidies to the emission-
intensive industry. Thus the economy is driven to complete specialization in
the emission-intensive good-1 sector. InFigure 7, the production equilibrium
is now given by point L1 again with the larger GHG emission than at the
emission quota equilibrium23.
Although the incomplete specialization equilibrium with emission quota
cannot be attained by emission standard, any complete specialization equi-
librium can be attained. If the equilibrium is at T under emission quota
in Figure 8, for instance, it can be attained by setting z1 = z1(rT;w T)a n d
z2 · z1(rT;w T).
Proposition 8 If the economy specializes completely under emission quota,
the equilibrium can be attained by the quota-equivalent emission standard.
But if the economy is diversi¯ed under emission quota, however, the only
production equilibrium under the quota-equivalent emission standard is com-
plete specialization in the emission-intensive industry with the larger GHG
emission.
22Note that the quota-equivalent emission standard requires di®erent rates of allowable
emission rates per unit of output between the sectors. In this sense, this standard must be
distinguished in general from the simple uniform emission standard which requires each
and every industry to emit the same volume of GHG emission per unit of, say, fossil fuel
input.
23Similarresults hold for the model developed in the previous section when one considers
the quota-equivalent emission standards. Each country with the quota-equivalentemission
standard has an incentive to overconsume fuel, so that at the resulting equilibrium the
emission standard level chosen by the government tends to be more stringent than at the
emission-quota equilibrium. See Kiyono and Okuno-Fujiwara (2000).
264 C o n c l u d i n gR e m a r k s{S o m eI m p l i c a t i o n sf o r
the Kyoto Mechanism
What we have attempted to clarify is potential e®ects of choices over the do-
mestic GHG emission controls. Although the world is now going towards in-
ternational cooperation against the global warming by proposing the Kyoto
mechanism, the mechanism lacks (i) really global cooperation, only covering
most advanced countries, and (ii) international enforceability of the coop-
erative measures. The proposed solutions calls for self-discipline of each
member participating the Kyoto mechanism, particularly with respect to
what domestic environmental policies are allowed to achieve the aim of the
group as a whole. In this respect, we believe that our results sheds some
light for discussing the need to further promote international cooperation
against the deem of the global warming.
Among the major results in the present paper, those in section 3 sounds
harsh, particularly for those promoting free international emissions trading,
the most important scheme in the Kyoto mechanism. Replace the role of
the emission tax in the previous section with the emission permit price in
the world emissions trading market. Our results still hold. This implies
that creation of international emissions trading market may make the world
trade and industrial structure very volatile against change in the world eco-
nomic environment. For further inquiry into this problem, one may have
to resort to possible implications from trade theories with free factor mobil-
ity. International emissions trading allows the assigned units of emissions
moves around the world and a®ects the production structure of each country
participating in the Kyoto mechanism.
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